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A BEAST OF BURDEN WITHOUT ANY REINS 
INTRODUCTION 
At a recent debt-settlement industry conference, the 
speakers’ stage was decorated to look like a boxing ring.1 This 
backdrop was meant to symbolize the industry’s need to fight 
back against its perceived opposition: lawmakers, regulators, 
and consumer-advocacy groups that want to put debt-
settlement companies out of business. At first glance, the 
backlash against the debt-settlement industry is perplexing, 
since the industry bills itself as a better alternative to 
bankruptcy for consumers struggling with unsecured debt.  
Irrespective of the conflict, the industry has been rapidly 
growing. One estimate places the total number of debt-
settlement companies at two-thousand—up from eighty or one 
hundred just six years ago.2 Industry advertising is much more 
prevalent and mainstream, and debt-settlement advertisements 
frequently appear on the front pages of New York City 
commuter newspapers. Remarkably, one major account-systems 
provider recently announced that it had aggregated over $3 
billion in consumer debt-settlement accounts.3  
Despite this growth, few outside the industry fully 
understand debt settlement as a service or its relationship to 
consumer-protection law. This note attempts to fill this void by 
providing a comprehensive examination of the debt-settlement 
industry and the legal issues it implicates. It begins with a 
brief history of debt-relief services targeting consumers. Part II 
provides a detailed explanation of the debt-settlement business 
model—its potential benefits and its fundamental problems 
  
 1 David Streitfeld, The Debt Settlement Industry Is Busy, But It’s a Bit 
Nervous, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/business/ 
10debt.html. 
 2 Pamela Yip, Debt Settlers Attract Customers, Scrutiny: Credit Solutions CEO 
Defends Ethics Amid Regulator Suits, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 30, 2009, at 1D. 
 3 Press Release, Persolvo Data Sys., Persolvo Data Systems Achieves $3 Billion 
Milestone (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://persolvodatasystems.com/pr/Persolvo_$3_ 
Billion_Dollar_Milestone_Wade-Torkelson.pdf. 
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that harm debt-settlement clients. Part III explains why past 
efforts, at both the federal and state level, have been 
inadequate to regulate this harm. Part IV discusses current 
regulatory proposals in federal law and uniform state law. It 
also examines the Federal Trade Commission’s recent rule 
amendments that address the harms caused by debt 
settlement. Finally, Part V argues that the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) is the ideal venue for regulating the debt-
settlement industry. This part also addresses the shortcomings 
of current FTC regulation. Although the FTC recently amended 
its regulations—wisely banning debt-settlement companies 
from collecting upfront fees—the amendments’ efficacy is 
severely limited by the absence of a private cause of action 
accessible to individual consumers. Administering these 
regulations is necessary to both rein in the industry and to 
ensure that debt-settlement services successfully assist 
consumers with the burdens of unsecured debt.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEBT-RELIEF SERVICES 
Debt-relief services have a long history in business and 
regulation. Early in the twentieth century, debt adjusters 
began operating as the first generation of this consumer 
service.4 Also known as debt consolidators, debt adjusters are 
for-profit services that attempt to persuade creditors to accept 
a less-than-full payment and discharge the remainder of a 
debtor’s obligations.5 If an agreement is reached, the debt 
adjuster collects a monthly payment from the debtor and 
distributes it to the creditor in accordance with the agreement.6  
Myriad problems existed within this particular business 
model. Debt adjusters often charged usurious rates assessed 
prior to creditor payment and created unreasonable payment 
plans.7 Complaints of deceptive advertising and outright fraud 
were also numerous.8 Consumers unable to timely pay creditors 
often found themselves in worse financial conditions after 
  
 4 Leslie E. Linfield, Uniform Debt Management Services Act: Regulating Two 
Related—Yet Distinct—Industries, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2009, at 50, 51. For much 
of this background on the history of debt-relief services, see UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. 
ACT, prefatory note (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2005).  
 5 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.  
 6 Id.  
 7 Carla Stone Witzel, The New Uniform Debt-Management Services Act, 60 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 650, 651 (2006). 
 8 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.  
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working with debt adjusters.9 In response, by 1970, most states 
had banned for-profit debt adjusters,10 and a majority of the 
remaining states had passed strict regulatory measures.11 
Despite this regulatory movement, many of these 
statutes exempted nonprofit organizations from debt-adjusting 
prohibitions, triggering the second generation of debt-relief 
services.12 In the 1960s, a trade association of credit-card-issuing 
businesses developed credit-counseling agencies for the express 
purpose of reducing consumer bankruptcy filings.13 These 
counseling agencies negotiate a debt-management plan (DMP) 
between debtors and creditors for full payment of the debt, albeit 
on modified terms.14 A counselor first determines if a modified 
plan is appropriate by examining the debtor’s financial 
information and then negotiating with existing unsecured 
creditors for modifications (such as reduced interest rates, 
lowered late fees, and time extensions for repayment).15 Once a 
DMP is set, the counselor takes monthly payments from the 
debtor and disburses pro-rata payments to creditors.16 Funded 
predominantly by participating creditors, these credit-counseling 
agencies also provide educational and financial-literacy 
counseling as a part of the overall debt-management plan.17  
As the amount of unsecured debt grew through the 1980s 
and 1990s, so did the credit-counseling industry—creating the 
third generation of debt-relief services.18 Competing trade 
associations organized around aggressive marketing strategies 
and cost cutting.19 These new agencies pushed for debt-
management plans at the expense of educational initiatives and 
  
 9 Witzel, supra note 7, at 651.  
 10 Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 455-457 (McKinney 2009). New York 
called debt adjusting “budget planning,” defined as  
the making of a contract . . . with a particular debtor whereby . . . the debtor 
agrees to pay a sum or sums of money in any manner or form and the person 
or entity engaged in the business of budget planning distributes . . . the same 
among certain specified creditors in accordance with a plan agreed upon. 
Id. § 455(1). 
 11 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51. 
 12 Id. New York explicitly exempted from its ban what it called “budget 
planning” not-for-profit entities. GEN. BUS. LAW § 455(4). 
 13 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,995 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id.  
 16 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51. 
 17 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,990.  
 18 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.  
 19 Id.  
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individualized counseling.20 As the market grew, creditors 
became less willing to fund these agencies, and higher fees were 
levied on the debtor.21 Critics charge that credit-counseling 
agencies now provide no social utility and operate simply as 
deceptive debt collectors on behalf of creditors.22 Many critics 
also allege illegal financial improprieties related to the agencies’ 
required use of nonprofit status.23 Due to the exemption of 
nonprofits from debt-adjuster laws, this industry remains 
largely unregulated.24 Nevertheless, the FTC and state attorneys 
general (AGs) have pursued many enforcement actions against 
credit-counseling agencies for violations of state and federal 
consumer-protection laws.25 
II. DEBT-SETTLEMENT COMPANIES 
A. The Business Model 
Debt settlement, the fourth generation of debt-relief 
services, differs significantly from credit counseling.26 Because 
the end result of a debt-settlement program is less-than-full 
payment of a debtor’s obligations, the service can also be 
thought of as a reappearance or reformulation of first-
generation debt adjusters.27 Indeed, one of the main industry 
trade associations describes a business familiar to consumer 
law professionals:  
By definition, debt settlement is the process by which a company 
negotiates with a consumer’s unsecured creditors over time for a 
reduction in principal, which is usually less than the current balance 
owed. History shows us that an offer from creditors, collection 
  
 20 Id.  
 21 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,991.  
 22 Witzel, supra note 7, at 652.  
 23 See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. 
& GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, PROFITEERING IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY: 
ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING, S. REP. NO. 109-55 (2005). Specifically, 
fraud and nonenforcement were identified as major issues.  
 24 Witzel, supra note 7, at 652. 
 25 For an extensive sample of enforcement actions, see Telemarketing Sales 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,991-92 nn.51-59. Generally, the FTC Act and state unfair-and-
deceptive-practices laws were used. For a discussion of these laws as they relate to the 
debt-settlement industry, see infra text accompanying notes 80-122. 
 26 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51. 
 27 Id. This comparison is not made as a conclusive argument in favor of 
regulation. Debt adjusters, as discussed above, were not banned because they sought 
less than full payment to creditors but because diverse, industry-wide abuse was 
identified.  
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agencies, debt buyers, and attorneys can range from as little as 5% of 
the outstanding claim to as much as 90% of the outstanding 
claim. . . . The process of debt settlement is, in theory, simple. A 
financially troubled consumer resolves an outstanding account, 
alleviating the consumer of that financial responsibility. The bank 
liquidates an account, saving the account from total loss.28 
Debt settlement, however, is unique. Unlike debt 
adjusters, the company creates a contract and payment plan 
prior to contacting or negotiating with any creditors.29 The 
debtor makes payments to a savings or escrow account, and 
once a target amount is achieved (often calculated based on a 
percentage of the total debt owed), the settlement company 
contacts the creditor and offers a sum that can be immediately 
paid from that account.30 Debt-settlement companies encourage 
saving enough money to effectuate settlements in escrow as 
quickly as possible,31 and typically, payment plans aim for 
achieving this amount in twenty-four to thirty-six months.32 
Inherent in this business model is “the ability of the 
debt settlement provider to time a consumer’s delinquency and 
rate of savings to coincide with a creditor’s or debt collector’s 
incentive to settle.”33 Generally, the industry has determined 
that creditors become much more willing to settle for lower 
payments once an account is more than 120 days in 
delinquency.34 Consequently, debt-settlement companies 
instruct clients to stop payments, default on accounts, and 
cease communication with creditors.35 To achieve this 
superficial divorce of debtor from creditor, debt-settlement 
companies often accept power of attorney to cease 
communication, instruct creditors to only contact the 
settlement company, or change billing addresses to route all 
creditor mail to the settlement company.36  
  
 28 U.S. ORGS. OF BANKR. ALTS., INC., DEBT SETTLEMENT: DEBT RELIEF: A 
GROWING NECESSITY FOR MANY CONSUMERS 6 (2008) [hereinafter GROWING NECESSITY], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtsettlementworkshop/536796-00022.htm. 
 29 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51. 
 30 Id.  
 31 ASS’N OF SETTLEMENT COS., TASC GENERAL RESPONSE TO QUESTION 
CARDS FROM FTC WORKSHOP 8 (2008) [hereinafter TASC RESPONSE]. 
 32 See Consumer Protection in the Debt Collection and Debt Management 
Industries: Hearing on A. 7268 Before the Comm. on Consumer Affairs & Prot., 2009 
Leg., 2 (N.Y. 2009) (testimony of Johnson M. Tyler) [hereinafter Tyler Testimony]. 
 33 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,993 (Aug. 19, 2009).  
 34 GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 7.  
 35 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,994; UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. 
ACT prefatory note 3 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2005).  
 36 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,994.  
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Debt-settlement companies frequently calculate fees 
using one of two methods: the settlement savings-fee method or 
the flat-fee method.37 The former bases most of the fee on a 
percentage of the savings realized by the debtor, while the 
latter is based on a percentage of the total debt managed by the 
settlement company.38 Additionally, enrollment fees and 
monthly maintenance fees are often calculated and charged 
separately.39 The FTC found that regardless of how fees are 
calculated, most companies charge using a “front-end fee 
model” that requires a debtor to pay a bulk of the fee within the 
first few months of enrollment, “whether or not any 
settlements have been attempted or achieved.”40 Some 
companies also require a debtor to pay all or almost all fees 
before any funds are released to creditors as a settlement.41  
B. The Good 
Demand for debt-relief services is high, yet “traditional 
[debt-management plans] have become less available to 
consumers who increasingly have insufficient income to repay 
their debts under such plans.”42 Completion of a debt-
settlement program can potentially reduce the debt owed by a 
consumer who is otherwise ineligible for debt management or 
liquidation bankruptcy.43 A hypothetical debt situation is 
helpful in understanding the potential benefit of debt-
  
 37 See TASC RESPONSE, supra note 31, at 2; see also GROWING NECESSITY, 
supra note 28, at 12. 
 38 TASC RESPONSE, supra note 31, at 2. 
 39 GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 13.  
 40 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,994. The FTC also describes 
two alternative fee structures—one in which the entire fee is collected during the first 
half of the enrollment period and one in which the bulk of the fee is not paid until the 
program is complete. Id.  
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 41,993; CAREONE CREDIT COUNSELING, BETWEEN FINANCIAL 
BALANCE AND BANKRUPTCY: BETTER OPTIONS FOR CONSUMERS STRUGGLING TO 
MANAGE UNSECURED DEBT 5 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ 
debtsettlementworkshop/536796-00035.pdf (estimating that, every year, “more than six 
million consumers interested in the traditional DMP either opt for another solution or 
do not meet the repayment criteria”).  
 43 Debt-management plans frequently require a debtor to show a sufficient 
ability to pay, something that many debtors cannot do. See CAREONE CREDIT 
COUNSELING, supra note 42, at 4. Similarly, recent amendments to the bankruptcy code 
make liquidation bankruptcy more difficult to obtain because of added eligibility 
requirements, which also increases filing expenses. See generally Andrew P. 
MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the BAPCPA, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
J. 407 (2008).  
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settlement services. A debtor that owed $10,000 in total debt 
might be charged a fee of 18% under the flat-fee model (or 
$1800).44 That debtor may be charged a $300 initiation fee and 
a $60-per-month service fee for the entire, say, thirty-six-
month program, resulting in service fees of $2460.45 Combined 
with the flat fee, the debt-settlement-program fees total $4260. 
Assume that the settlement company is able to negotiate a 40% 
settlement of the total debt in this situation—a number that 
debt-settlement companies claim is possible.46 In this scenario, 
the debtor will have paid $4000 to settle the actual debt and an 
additional $4260 in fees—a total of $8260. The debtor saved 
close to 20% on the total $10,000 debt owed, and the entire 
program lasted only three years. This is a best-case scenario. 
C. The Bad 
The best-case scenario is not necessarily the norm. State 
attorneys general report a two-fold increase in the number of 
complaints against debt-settlement companies in 2009.47 Major 
news outlets—including ABC’s Nightline and World News 
Saturday, and CBS’s The Early Show—have recently run 
features critical of the debt-settlement industry and warning 
consumers of its drawbacks.48 In 2008, debt settlement was listed 
in Better Business Bureau as one of the top-ten business 
scams.49 Two prominent New York legal-services organizations 
advise against using debt-settlement programs entirely; one 
bluntly stated, “[d]ebt settlement companies are a rip-off.”50 Debt 
settlement often results in unforeseen harm for consumers. 
One major concern is the success rate within the 
industry. A voluntary study conducted by an industry trade 
  
 44 See TASC RESPONSE, supra note 31, at 2. This hypothetical uses numbers 
that two leading trade associations provided to the FTC. Id.  
 45 GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 13. For illustrative purposes, I have 
chosen potential fees on the higher side of ranges provided by debt-settlement 
companies.  
 46 Id. at 6.  
 47 David Streitfeld, Debt Settlers Offer Promises But Little Help, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/business/20settle.html. 
 48 See, e.g., The Early Show (CBS television broadcast May 12, 2009); 
Nightline (ABC television broadcast July 25, 2009); World News Saturday (ABC 
television broadcast Aug. 22, 2009). 
 49 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.  
 50 Peter Dellinger, Debt Settlement Scams, EMPIRE JUST. CENTER (Aug. 13, 2009), 
http://www.empirejustice.org/issue-areas/consumer-community-development/credit-cards/ 
debt-settlement-scams.html; Tyler Testimony, supra note 32, at 2. 
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association found only a 35% to 60% debtor “completion rate.”51 
Even worse, a National Consumer Law Center report stated 
that only 1.4% of consumers completed a debt-settlement 
program after enrolling.52 Similarly, New York Attorney 
General Andrew Cuomo reported that one debt-settlement 
company promised a 60% reduction in debt yet only achieved 
those results for 1% of enrolled consumers.53 In one suit brought 
by the State of Texas against a debt-settlement company, the 
State alleged that the company’s own internal data showed 
that fewer than 20% of individual accounts reached a 
settlement of any amount.54 
The FTC describes the problems with debt-settlement 
services as two-fold: (1) “the marketing and advertising” of 
debt-settlement programs and (2) their fundamental soundness 
for consumers.55 Speaking to the former, debt-settlement 
companies advertise heavily on television, radio, and the 
internet.56 A common strategy is to highlight the long-term 
consequences of bankruptcy and present debt settlement as a 
better alternative.57 Specific outcomes are frequently touted: 
Common claims in the ads . . . include representations that debt 
settlement companies will obtain for consumers who enroll in a debt 
settlement plan any of the following results: a reduction of their 
debts by 50%; elimination of debt in 12-36 months; cessation of 
harassing calls from debt collectors and collection lawsuits; and 
expert assistance from debt settlement providers who have special 
relationships with creditors and knowledge about available 
techniques to induce settlement. Debt settlement companies also 
frequently represent that there is a high likelihood (sometimes even 
a “guarantee”) of success.58 
  
 51 ASS’N OF SETTLEMENT COS., STUDY ON THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 1 
(2007). The study accepted companies’ self-reported completion rates, which had been 
calculated using different standards. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 
41,995 n.104 (Aug. 19, 2009). The FTC was highly critical of this methodology. Id. 
 52 DEANNE LOONIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., AN INVESTIGATION OF DEBT 
SETTLEMENT COMPANIES: AN UNSETTLING BUSINESS FOR CONSUMERS 5 (2005) 
[hereinafter UNSETTLING BUSINESS]. 
 53 Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Sues Debt 
Settlement Companies for Deceiving and Harming Consumers (May 19, 2009), 
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/may/may19b_09.html. 
 54 Streitfeld, supra note 47. 
 55 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,995 (internal citations omitted). 
 56 Suzanne Ziegler, New Law Tightens Rules for Debt Firms, STAR TRIB. 
(Minn.) (June 7, 2009), http://www.startribune.com/business/47061237.html. 
 57 See, e.g., Streitfeld, supra note 1. 
 58 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,995. 
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In light of the industry’s low completion rates, these claims are 
dubious at best.59 Touting guaranteed specific reduction 
percentages and completion dates without concern for 
individual circumstances or overall success rates is reckless 
and deceptive. Indeed, even the executive director of a debt-
settlement trade association commented, “the main concern is 
consumers are being misled through false advertising.”60 
More troubling are the fundamental flaws in the nature 
of debt-settlement services. Debt-settlement companies claim 
to maintain strong relationships with creditors61 and market 
their experience with creditor settlement procedures as a 
benefit.62 But it is not clear that creditors are even receptive to 
working with debt-settlement companies. One executive of the 
American Bankers Association—the professional association 
representing the banking industry—described debt-settlement 
companies as “very harmful to both creditor and consumer.”63 
Another American Bankers Association senior representative 
stated that creditors want to work with customers “without the 
significant negative consequences to the consumer that flow 
from the insertion of the debt-settlement company into the 
relationship.”64 In fact, many consumer advocates recommend 
contacting creditors directly to negotiate reductions as a better 
alternative to debt-settlement programs.65 
  
 59 Id. 
 60 John Pacenti, McCollum: Consumers Better Off Avoiding Debt Settlement 
Firms, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Oct. 20, 2008, at 1. 
 61 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,995.  
 62 UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 10. One debt-settlement trade 
association went so far as to state,  
It is common for debt settlement company representatives to have a 
relationship with specific contacts at creditor offices or collection agencies 
that they work with in the negotiation process. Some creditors and collection 
agencies have developed, or are in the process of developing, specific 
departments that work exclusively with debt settlement companies. For these 
creditors and collection agencies, working with debt settlement companies 
allows them to handle a large quantity of accounts with a limited amount of 
manpower, minimizing the costs associated with collection activity and 
maximizing liquidation percentages. 
GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 8. 
 63 Streitfeld, supra note 47 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64 Pacenti, supra note 60, at 1. 
 65 See, e.g., Sandra Block, When Settling Debt, Watch out for Scam Artists 
Waiting to Pounce, USA TODAY, July 21, 2009, at B3; Tara Siegel Bernard, Weighing the 
Options with Credit Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/05/16/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/16counsel.html; David Streitfeld, Credit 
Bailout: Issuers Slashing Card Balances, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2009), http://www. 
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Moreover, debt-settlement companies encourage debtor 
default—either explicitly or implicitly—a strategy that is 
unavoidably harmful to consumers.66 The industry openly 
admits that delinquency aids the negotiation process.67 But 
payment default has a profoundly negative impact on the 
debtor more generally: “creditors often impose additional 
finance charges, delinquency fees and may undertake collection 
activity, including litigation.”68 This response is not surprising; 
creditors may go months without receiving payment or any 
communication on behalf of a debtor’s account after the debtor 
enrolls in a settlement program. Payment neglect may even 
accelerate the collection process.69 Indeed, one FTC enforcement 
action against a consortium of debt-settlement companies 
revealed that 5679 collection lawsuits were filed against the 
companies’ approximately 18,116 clients during a one-year 
period.70 Compounding the problem, many clients are unaware 
that they are subject to traditional collection measures once 
enrolled in debt-settlement programs, and debt-settlement 
companies provide no assistance with the consequences.71  
Additionally, debt-settlement programs are financially 
infeasible for their target population of debtors: 
Debt settlement companies have described the ideal debt settlement 
customer as someone who is suffering from a hardship of some kind 
and having difficulty making payments . . . and cannot afford to pay 
their debts. Some companies will work only with insolvent 
customers, defined in some cases to mean consumers who are 
unemployed. Others require that the consumer be in a hardship 
situation. One company states that its program is appropriate for 
consumers with little or no ability to pay their debts and facing 
possible bankruptcy. “It is not for people who are gainfully employed 
or have high credit ratings.” Another company strongly discourages 
people with good credit.72 
Indeed, of the three debt-settlement clients described in a 
recent New York Assembly committee hearing on the problems 
  
nytimes.com/2009/06/16/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/16credit.html; Susan Tompor, 
Be Wary of Offers to Settle Debt, BELLEVILLE NEWS DEMOCRAT, May 28, 2009. 
 66 UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 5; Linfield, supra note 4, at 60. 
 67 GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 7.  
 68 Linfield, supra note 4, at 51.  
 69 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,994 n.86 (Aug. 19, 2009).  
 70 Id. at 41,996 n.109 (citing Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly, No. 
SA CV 06-701 DOC RNBx (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2006)).  
 71 UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 6. 
 72 Id. at 4. 
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within the industry, not one was employed.73 Monthly 
charges—which include money to be put in escrow and service 
fees—often exceed a client’s ability to pay.74 High monthly 
payments are only exacerbated by the front-end fee model—
now an industry standard.75 Many settlement companies claim 
to have a screening process to ensure that clients can afford the 
given monthly payments.76 But it is hard to accept this 
assertion given the extremely low success rate, the industry’s 
stated preference for indigent clients, and the available 
examples of common payment schedules.77 Further, for many 
indigent clients, their only income and assets are exempt from 
collection under applicable state and federal laws—a fact that 
debt-settlement companies would undoubtedly discover under 
any financial audit.78 The economically infeasible nature of 
debt-settlement programs seriously undermines their utility for 
both debtors and creditors.  
III. EXISTING REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Commonly used regulatory and enforcement schemes 
are ill equipped to address the problems within the debt-
settlement industry. Current laws were not designed with 
reference to debt settlement and do not attack the industry’s 
fundamental problems.79  
A. FTC Action 
FTC action has been a frequent method of enforcement. 
Responding to consumer complaints, the FTC targets debt-
settlement companies for deceptive and misleading 
  
 73 Tyler Testimony, supra note 32, at 2-3.  
 74 UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 4. 
 75 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,994 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
 76 GROWING NECESSITY, supra note 28, at 7.  
 77 See UNSETTLING BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 4. One example is a $300-per-
month plan set for a woman whose only source of income was Social Security. Tyler 
Testimony, supra note 32, at 2.  
 78 See Tyler Testimony, supra note 32, at 3; see also UNSETTLING BUSINESS, 
supra note 52, at 4. 
 79 Although the FTC has now passed rule amendments specifically 
addressing the debt-settlement industry (most of which became effective on September 
27, 2010), the discussion here is limited to longer-standing regulatory sources under 
which enforcement actions have originated. Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
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advertising.80 Since 2001, the FTC has filed seven actions, some 
of which involved multiple companies and individuals.81 Most 
commonly, the FTC alleges violations of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act).82 The FTC Act is broadly worded, 
providing that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce, are . . . unlawful.”83 Consequently, FTC 
actions under this law have alleged violations such as 
misrepresented fees, undisclosed fees, falsely promised success 
rates, and failure to warn of negative consequences.84 
FTC actions against debt-settlement companies have 
been successful in limited circumstances. For example, one 
settlement agreement stipulated that an individual defendant, 
the ex-CEO of a debt-settlement company that allegedly 
violated the FTC Act, could no longer engage in telemarketing 
or debt negotiation.85 Similarly, a different settlement 
agreement obtained by the FTC for alleged FTC Act violations 
permanently banned an individual defendant and a corporate 
defendant from engaging in debt-negotiation services of any 
kind.86 The FTC has also recovered substantial monetary 
refunds through settlements.87 
  
 80 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,996; see also ROBERT J. 
HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 624-25 (6th ed. 2008). 
 81 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,996. 
 82 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006). See, e.g., Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Connelly, No. SA CV 06-701 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2006); Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Nat’l Consumer Council, No. SA CV 04-0474 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2004); Complaint, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Debt Set, Inc., No. 07 CV 00558 (D. Co. Mar. 20, 2007).  
 83 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  
 84 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, ‘Debt Meltdown Program’ 
Marketers Settle with FTC; Charged with Failing to Deliver Promised Debt Reduction 
Services (Aug. 5, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/08/edge.shtm; Press 
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Debt-Negotiation Defendants Agree to Settle FTC 
Charges in Nationwide Operation That Led Many into Financial Ruin (Sept. 25, 2008), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/nss.shtm; Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Debt Reduction Companies Settle with FTC (Feb. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/debtreduct.shtm. 
 85 Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Final Order as to Defendant Dennis 
Connelly at 6, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly, No. SA CV 06-701 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2008). 
 86 Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction Against 
Defendants Todd A. Baker and Debt Resolution Specialists, Inc. at 8-9, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Innovative Sys. Tech., Inc., No. CV 04-0728 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2005).  
 87 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Debt Services Operations 
Settle FTC Charges (Mar. 30, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/ 
creditcouncel.shtm. Here an FTC settlement agreement with NCC required corporate 
defendants to pay $1 million and three individual defendants to pay $3.5 million, after 
the FTC had recovered $24 million in funds held in corporate trust accounts. Id.  
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Despite these successes, the FTC is not able to address 
the full extent of abuse in the debt-settlement industry. As an 
agency, the FTC is tasked with numerous categories of 
consumer protection involving many statutes—resulting in 
limited resources for any one issue.88 Indeed, while the FTC has 
identified abuse in the industry widespread enough to justify 
increased regulation,89 it has only brought seven enforcement 
actions since 200190—despite its broad discretion under the 
FTC Act to determine what actually constitutes consumer 
harm.91 Additionally, the FTC Act, under which the FTC has 
achieved most of its settlements, disallows private causes of 
action.92 This means that individuals who are harmed by 
violations of the Act are “encouraged to complain to the 
Commission, [but their] complaints give them no formal 
standing before the Commission or the courts.”93 Thus, 
recognizing its internal limitations, the FTC itself has 
advocated the creation of private causes of action for consumer 
matters.94 Finally, while FTC enforcement has been able to 
selectively shutter debt-settlement companies for employing 
deceitful advertising, the FTC Act does not address the 
fundamental problems of the industry—namely, untenable fee 
structures, and harmful delays between client payments and 
services rendered.95  
  
 88 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 95 (2008). 
 89 See Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458 (Aug. 10, 
2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
 90 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,994, 41,996 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
 91 Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of 
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2005).  
 92 PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LAW PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3.04 (Law Journal Press 2010). 
 93 Id.  
 94 William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. 
REV. 724, 729 n.10 (1972) (“FTC enforcement effort against deceptive trade practices 
suffers from crucial and probably inherent limitations. . . . [T]he federal effort is 
modestly staffed, far removed from most local communities, and, consequently, must be 
concentrated against national media advertising with only occasional test cases against 
smaller scale law violators. In recent years . . . the FTC itself [has] strongly endorsed 
and emphasized the need for . . . viable private remedies for consumers.”).  
 95 On at least one occasion, the FTC brought an action for FTC Act violations 
based on failure to disclose the potential harmful effects of discontinuing payment to 
one’s original creditors. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Fraudulent “Debt 
Negotiators” Settle FTC Charges (July 19, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opa/2005/07/briggsbaker.shtm. But this allegation still does not address the 
fundamental problems of the debt-settlement model. A company could easily comply 
with the law by using contractual fine print and simultaneously do nothing to protect 
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B. State Attorneys General 
Like the FTC, state attorneys general also frequently 
target debt-settlement companies in civil actions.96 Often, AGs 
allege unfair or deceptive acts and practices committed by debt-
settlement companies in violation of state consumer law.97 For 
example, in May 2009, New York Attorney General Andrew 
Cuomo filed suit against two debt-settlement companies 
alleging deceptive business practices and false advertising.98 
The suits followed subpoenas issued by the AG to fourteen 
debt-settlement companies requesting information about fee 
structures, completion rates, and services rendered.99 One of 
these cases has already been decided, levying a civil penalty of 
$198,100 against Nationwide Asset Services, Inc. for 
defrauding 1981 consumers.100 The court also ordered a 
complete refund to 180 consumers and enjoined the company 
from doing further business in New York unless it provided a 
$500,000 performance bond.101  
Although these AG actions can be financially effective for 
select consumers, they provide only short-term solutions that 
  
clients from the permanently damaging actions of creditors once payments and 
communication cease.  
 96 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,997 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
 97 Id. at 41,996. For an extensive list of AG enforcement actions from around 
the country, see id. at 41,997 nn.132-33. For a discussion of state deceptive-acts laws, 
also called “little FTC Acts,” see Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 91, at 15. AGs also 
frequently target debt-settlement companies for violations of more narrowly written 
debt-management statutes. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 41,997 n.134. 
State laws specifically targeting debt-management services are discussed at length 
infra Part IV.B. And because New York has not yet passed this type of legislation, a 
description of its enforcement is not relevant here. 
 98 Verified Complaint, Cuomo v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am., No. 
401225/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2009); Verified Petition, Cuomo v. Nationwide 
Asset Servs., Inc., No. 2009-5710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 2009). Both complaints alleged 
that defendants Nationwide Asset Services and Credit Solutions of America Inc. (CSA) 
engaged in fraud, deceptive business acts, and false advertising in violation of New 
York law; only the CSA complaint alleged violations of New York’s credit-services law. 
These particular New York statutes are discussed infra Part III.B in the context of 
private causes of action.  
 99 Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces 
Nationwide Investigation into Debt Settlement Industry (May 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/may/may7a_09.html.  
 100 Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Obtains Court 
Order Barring Debt Settlement Company that Ripped Off Thousands of New York 
Consumers from Operating in NYS Unless It Meets Strict Requirements (Oct. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/oct/oct15b_09.html. 
According to the AG’s office, the “court found that the majority of . . . customers were 
promised a 25 to 40 percent reduction in their outstanding debt but never saw such 
reductions. Only one-third of one percent of consumers received such savings.” Id. 
 101 Id.  
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are limited in ways similar to FTC actions. The New York AG’s 
office does not prosecute directly on behalf of individual 
consumers; there must be a widespread need for it to proceed.102 
The result is that lone consumers may not be able to use the AG 
to enforce their legal rights. Further, these New York cases are 
based on laws that address only general fraudulent and 
deceptive practices by debt-settlement companies. Accordingly, a 
debt-settlement company can easily comply with basic disclosure 
requirements while simultaneously collecting upfront fees that 
far exceed the value of services rendered. Similarly, AG actions 
fail to address the industry’s fundamental problems because 
they are brought under state laws with limited breadth. Like the 
FTC, AGs cannot target infeasible fee structures or delays in 
services that cause creditors to pursue debtors for payment 
defaults while under a debt-settlement program. Absent false or 
misleading statements, the AG is unable to act against debt-
settlement companies.  
C. Private Enforcement 
Private causes of action also target debt-settlement 
companies with varied but less-than-sufficient success. The 
Federal Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) is one statute 
that allows individuals to assert violations by debt-settlement 
companies.103 The CROA provides that “credit repair 
organizations” may not receive money or valuable 
consideration in advance of performing agreed-upon services.104 
A credit-repair organization is defined as any person or entity 
that provides services for the express or implied purpose of 
either (1) “improving any consumer’s credit record, credit 
history, or credit rating” or (2) “providing advice or assistance 
to any consumer with regard to” such services.105 In passing the 
CROA, Congress desired to ensure that consumers had 
  
 102 Indeed, in the two cases against debt-settlement companies, 18,000 New 
York residents had enrolled with one company, while 1981 had enrolled with another 
one, illustrating the size of cases taken by the AG. David Streitfeld, New York Accuses 
2 Debt Settlement Firms of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/05/20/business/20debt.html.  
 103 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679-1679j (2006). See, e.g., Complaint, Yunker v. Rise Above 
Debt Relief LLC, No. 09-CV-1204-01 (D. Kan. June 30, 2009); Complaint, Boyken v. 
Am. Debt Arbitration, No. 6:07-cv-06348 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007); Complaint, Cortese 
v. Edge Solutions, Inc., No. CV-04 0956 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).  
 104 15 U.S.C. § 1679b(b).  
 105 Id. § 1679a(3). Nonprofit organizations and a particular debtor’s original 
creditors are explicitly exempted from the statute’s provisions. Id. 
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necessary information when purchasing such services, and to 
protect the public from unfair and deceptive business practices 
in the industry.106 
Debt-settlement fee structures would violate the 
CROA’s ban on upfront fees because no debt-settlement 
company begins negotiations with creditors until all or a 
substantial portion of fees have been collected.107 But in the 
limited cases on the issue, courts have refused to find that 
debt-settlement services alone fulfill the CROA’s definition of a 
credit-repair organization.108 Absent a showing that the 
company, at a minimum, advertised or engaged in specific 
credit-related issues, courts are unwilling to declare that debt-
settlement companies are credit-repair organizations. In 
Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., for example, an Illinois district 
court held that a debt-settlement company administering a 
credit-repair program was not a credit-repair organization 
because the company had “ma[de] clear that participation in 
[its] program [would] likely result in damage to the 
participant’s credit” and “that the participant’s credit is outside 
the scope of the program.”109 Thus, the court concluded, the 
company “did not represent or even imply that [its] program 
was designed to improve the participant’s credit as required for 
[it] to be a credit repair organization.”110 Indeed, the debt-
settlement companies that the courts have deemed credit-
repair organizations have aimed, explicitly or implicitly, to 
improve their clients’ credit rating.111 In light of this case law, a 
debt-settlement company can easily avoid CROA liability by 
tailoring its representations while still retaining harmful 
aspects of its business model.  
  
 106 Id. § 1679(b).  
 107 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,994 (Aug. 19, 2009).  
 108 See HOBBS, supra note 80, at 624-25. 
 109 Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 969, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
The court stated that “[w]hether a company is a credit repair organization under the 
CROA depends on the representations made.” Id.  
 110 Id. 
 111 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254-57 
(N.D. Ala. 2008) (finding that a debt-settlement program that advertised credit 
improvement met the CROA’s definition of credit-repair organization), vacated on other 
grounds, Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2009); Cortese v. 
Edge Solutions, Inc., No. 04-0956, 2007 WL 2782750, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007) 
(holding that a debt-settlement company was a credit-repair organization because it 
advertised and rendered a supplemental program explicitly designed to repair credit 
following the traditional settlement program). 
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CROA’s legislative history also does not support the 
statute’s application to the debt-settlement industry. A U.S. 
House of Representatives report accompanying the CROA’s 
passage states that “[t]he credit repair business involves the 
marketing of credit repair services to consumers whose 
consumer reports contain adverse information that interferes 
with their ability to obtain credit.”112 More succinctly, “credit 
repair organizations . . . help consumers eliminate adverse 
information from consumer reports.”113 Debt-settlement 
companies, however, do not purport to perform this function. 
Rather, these companies exist to eliminate outstanding debt on 
their clients’ behalf. Absent material representations about 
improving credit worthiness, debt settlement does not fall 
within Congress’s purpose in enacting the CROA.114 Although 
the CROA may be useful for certain consumers, it is 
inadequate as regulation of the industry as a whole.  
Many states have enacted CROA analogs that provide an 
additional private cause of action for debt-settlement clients.115 
For instance, New York’s CROA analog applies to “credit 
services businesses”—defined identically to the federal CROA’s 
credit-repair organizations.116 The New York law imposes specific 
disclosure requirements on credit-services companies and 
  
 112 Hillis v. Equifax Consumer Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491, 513 (N.D. Ga. 
2006) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-486, at 57 (1994)).  
 113 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-2009, at 7 (1993)).  
 114 For an extensive discussion of the CROA’s legislative history, see id. As the 
district court noted in Hillis, 
To utilize an analogy from the sport of golf, a [credit-repair organization] is 
like a person who offers to improve a golfer’s score after a round is over by 
reviewing and making changes to the golfer’s score card or by telling the 
golfer how he can make changes to his score card. By contrast, a person who 
offers to give a golfer swing tips to improve his score the next time he heads 
out on the course is not a [credit-repair organization]. 
Id. at 514. The Hillis court was not discussing debt-settlement companies, but the 
distinction between editing a scorecard and performing differently in the future is 
relevant. Congress intended the CROA to regulate the former while debt settlement is 
a service much more like the latter. 
 115 For a comprehensive discussion of various state credit-repair laws and 
their scope, see CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 15.3 
(6th ed. 2006).  
 116 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 458-a to 458-k (McKinney 2009) (defining a credit 
service business as person who provides “a service for the express or implied purpose of 
improving a consumer’s credit record, history, or rating or providing advice or 
assistance to a consumer with regard to the consumer’s credit record history or rating 
in return for the payment of a fee”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3) (2006) (codification of 
the federal CROA). New York law, like the federal CROA, exempts nonprofits and 
original creditors from regulation. GEN. BUS. § 458-b.  
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prohibits them from accepting fees before performing services.117 
Given the New York CROA’s similarity to its federal 
counterpart, courts are likely to interpret its definitional scope 
similarly: debt settlement qua debt settlement is not a credit-
services business.118 Indeed, state credit-repair laws “generally 
cover the same variety of organizations as the [federal CROA].”119 
Just as the federal CROA does not adequately regulate the debt-
settlement industry, it is unlikely that courts will read state 
analogs to do so. 
Additionally, New York’s deceptive-acts-and-practices 
law provides a private cause of action that may also apply to 
the debt-settlement industry.120 Section 349 states very simply 
and broadly that “[d]eceptive acts and practices in the conduct 
of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any 
service in this state are hereby declared unlawful.”121 Modeled 
on the FTC Act provision discussed above,122 New York courts 
have interpreted section 349 using FTC Act case law and 
legislative history.123 Since the FTC has been relatively 
successful in the few actions it has brought against debt-
settlement companies, similarly situated plaintiffs in New York 
may be successful in section 349 actions. At least one suit 
brought under section 349 against a debt-settlement company, 
for example, settled out of court. The complaint, filed in the 
Western District of New York, alleged numerous section 349 
violations for a debt-settlement company’s statements about 
  
 117 GEN. BUS. §§ 458-d, 458-e. 
 118 Although plaintiff Cortese pleaded violations of section 458, the court 
denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds without 
discussing the merits of the plaintiff’s state-law claims. Cortese v. Edge Solutions, Inc., 
No. 04-0956, 2007 WL 2782750, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007). Cortese, therefore, 
provides no insight into how it would apply section 458 to a debt-settlement company.  
 119 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 115, at § 15.3.2. But New York credit-repair 
law does explicitly exempt “[a]ny person admitted to practice law in this state where 
the person renders services within the course and scope of his or her practice as an 
attorney at law.” GEN. BUS. § 458-b(1)(b). There is no similar exemption under the 
federal CROA. This New York exemption would be relevant in a situation where a law 
firm provides debt-settlement services (and, thus, might claim exemption from the New 
York law). While the intended scope of the exemption is unclear, one could argue that 
debt settlement is not “within the course and scope” of law practice and should 
therefore not be exempted.  
 120 See GEN. BUS. § 349. 
 121 Id. § 349(a). 
 122 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Indeed, these state laws are known as “little FTC 
Acts.” Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 91, at 15 (quoting J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, 
New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative 
Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 357 (1992)).  
 123 State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. Colo. State Christian Coll. of Church of Inner 
Power, Inc., 346 N.Y.S.2d 482, 487 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).  
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the time required for services to be rendered and the success 
rates of its program.124  
Nonetheless, section 349 has many of the same 
limitations as its federal counterpart. While section 349 may 
benefit certain individuals, like the FTC Act, it addresses only 
deceptive behavior. In enacting section 349, the New York 
legislature did not intend to address debt-settlement companies; 
indeed, its passage predates the rapid expansion of debt-
settlement usage. Consequently, section 349 does not address 
the core problems of the debt-settlement industry. Section 349 
provides consumers with only a limited resource and contributes 
little to the needed comprehensive regulatory framework.  
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Public concerns about the debt-settlement industry have 
not escaped the attention of regulators and legislators—federal 
and state alike. This section provides a detailed explanation of 
recent legislative efforts, as well as rule amendments passed by 
the FTC to regulate the debt-settlement industry.  
A. Congressional Efforts 
The U.S. House of Representatives has proposed a few 
different measures to address the deleterious effects of debt 
settlement. In 2003, the House proposed a resolution that 
mandated significant advertising and contract disclosures, and 
prohibited upfront fees.125 The bill also banned debt-settlement 
companies from advising clients to discontinue payments owed 
to their original creditors.126 The bill was referred to committee 
in late 2003, and has not been voted on or reintroduced since.127  
More recently, the House introduced a bill that would 
give the FTC expedited rulemaking powers to regulate debt-
  
 124 Complaint at 10, Boyken v. Am. Debt Arbitration, No. 6:07-cv-06348 
(W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007).  
 125 Debt Counseling, Debt Consolidation, and Debt Settlement Practices 
Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 3331, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).  
 126 Id. § 1003(c)(1).  
 127 See H.R. 3331 Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas. 
loc.gov (follow “Try the Advanced Search” link; then select “108” under “Select 
Congress”; then select “Bill Number” in the drop-down menu under “Enter Search”; 
then enter “H.R. 3331” in text search box; then follow “search hyperlink”; then follow 
“All Congressional Actions” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2011); see also Library of 
Congress, THOMAS ONLINE DATABASE, http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).  
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settlement companies.128 Specifically, the bill directs the FTC to 
consider banning upfront fees and requiring certain disclosures 
by the debt-settlement industry.129 No action has been taken on 
this bill since June 3, 2009,130 likely due, in part, to the FTC’s 
broader independent efforts and Congress’s proposals for 
institutional change. As discussed below, the FTC 
independently passed amended rules creating regulations 
pertaining to “debt relief services”131—entirely supplanting the 
need for the House’s expedited rulemaking.  
Additionally, Congress recently passed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which 
created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.132 The 
bureau is tasked with regulating all financial products and 
services, which are defined to explicitly include debt-settlement 
services.133 That Congress specifically tasked a new federal 
agency with regulating the debt-settlement industry suggests 
that it is unlikely to pursue further legislation.  
B. Uniform State Laws 
Although congressional action is frozen, state 
legislatures have recognized the need to tackle the problems of 
the debt-settlement industry. As discussed above, states have 
commonly regulated debt-relief services in the past through 
piecemeal legislation.134 Recently, however, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) began an effort to reverse this trend.135 In 2005, the 
NCCUSL approved for dissemination a final version of the 
Uniform Debt-Management Services Act (UDMSA).136 In brief, 
  
 128 Consumer Credit and Debt Protection Act, H.R. 2309, 111th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2009).  
 129 Id. § 2(b).  
 130 See H.R. 2309 Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas. 
loc.gov (follow “Try the Advanced Search” link; then select “111” under “Select 
Congress”; then select “Bill Number” in the drop-down menu under “Enter Search”; 
then enter “H.R. 2309” in text search box; then follow “search hyperlink”; then follow 
“All Congressional Actions” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). 
 131 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 41,988 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
 132 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5491). 
 133 Id. § 1002(15)(A)(viii)(II).  
 134 See supra Part I.  
 135 For a full background and history of the NCCUSL, see generally James J. 
White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096 (1991).  
 136 Jeffrey S. Tenenbaum & Jonathan L. Pompan, Proposed Uniform Debt-
Management Services Act to Effect Major Changes in the Law, 123 BANK. L.J. 502, 502 (2006). 
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the UDMSA purports to regulate debt-management services, 
including both credit-counseling agencies and debt-settlement 
companies.137 Of course, the UDMSA is not law at promulgation; 
state legislatures must adopt and enact its provisions.138 But a 
handful of states have enacted the UDMSA so far.139  
At its foundation, the UDMSA prohibits companies and 
individuals from providing “debt management services” 
without registering at the state level.140 Debt-management 
services are defined “as an intermediary between an individual 
and one or more creditors for the individual for the purpose of 
obtaining concessions.”141 The comments to this subsection 
clarify that debt-management services encompass any 
intermediary that attempts to change the terms of a debt 
contract—even when the intermediary does not have control 
over an individual’s escrow funds—and explicitly mention debt-
settlement companies.142 The UDMSA exempts specific entities 
from its coverage.143 The UDMSA also includes alternative 
language that allows states to decide whether to allow for-
profit companies.144 For example, a state could enact UDMSA 
language banning all for-profit debt-settlement services; or it 
could opt for language allowing only for-profit debt-settlement 
services and prohibiting for-profit credit counseling.145  
  
 137 Id.  
 138 White, supra note 135, at 2096. 
 139 E.g. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.5-201 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. 
TIT. 6 § 2401A (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1116 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 332A.02 (West 2010); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2401 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 19-14.8-1 (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-7-101 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 13-42-101 (West 2010). The UDMSA has also been proposed in New York. The bill 
adopting the UDMSA regulations was introduced in the New York Assembly and was 
referred to the Consumer Affairs and Protection Committee on March 27, 2009. The 
committee held a hearing on May 8, 2009. N.Y. Assemb., A. 7268, 2009 Leg. (N.Y. 
2009). But no action has since been taken on the bill. 
 140 UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. ACT § 4(a) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on 
Unif. State Laws 2005). Registration is made with a state agency designated or created 
by a state for administering the UDMSA. Id. § 2(1). Approval of registration in one 
state shall be accepted as valid in another state so long as the information is 
substantially similar or more comprehensive than that required by the second state. Id. 
§ 12(1). 
 141 Id. § 2(9).  
 142 Id. § 2 cmt. 8. The UDMSA is also explicitly intended to cover credit-
counseling agencies. In fact, when originally written in 2003, the UDMSA only covered 
credit-counseling agencies. Debt-settlement companies were not included until a 
NCCUSL decision in 2004. Id. at 4 (prefatory note).  
 143 For example, judicial officers and banks are specifically exempted. Id. § 3. 
 144 Id. § 4(d).  
 145 Id.; see also Tenenbaum & Pompan, supra note 136, at 506. For example, the 
version proposed by the New York legislature, see supra note 139, would require any 
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Once registered, the UDMSA imposes significant 
regulation on a debt-settlement company. One drafter described 
UDMSA regulations as “four pillars” that respond to recognized 
past abuse by “(1) safeguarding the debtor’s money; (2) 
disclosing the credit counselor’s relationship with and payment 
by creditors; (3) requiring adequate financial education; and, 
perhaps most importantly, (4) requiring credit counselors to 
determine that a [debt-management plan] is suitable for the 
debtor before enrolling the debtor in [the plan].”146  
The UDMSA purports to accomplish the first goal—
safeguarding a debtor’s money—in several ways. First, it 
requires registered companies to provide extensive biographical 
information.147 This requirement is intended to prevent highway 
banditry and to lower enforcement costs by allowing a state 
administrator to easily locate companies. Additionally, the 
UDMSA mandates that registered companies have a bond, 
certificate of insurance, or letter of credit in an amount deemed 
sufficient to cover potential payments of damages—which 
protects against company insolvency.148 Trust accounts (also 
known as escrow accounts) must conform to specific guidelines: 
notably, money in a trust must be promptly returned to the 
individual upon cancellation of a service program.149 Finally, the 
UDMSA specifically limits the fees that a debt-settlement 
company may charge.150 Service fees are not to exceed $50 
monthly; set-up fees are not to exceed $400 monthly; and debt-
  
debt-management company—including debt-settlement companies—to be nonprofit 
before registering and conducting business in New York. N.Y. Assemb., A. 7268, 2009 
Leg. Sess. § 579-C (N.Y. 2009). The specific language, borrowed directly from the 
UDMSA, provides that no company may register unless it is (1) organized and properly 
running as a not-for-profit under the law of the state in which it was formed, and (2) 
exempt from taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. Despite this 
for-profit ban, however, the New York bill as proposed does not alter the UDMSA’s 
general fee-cap provisions. Id. § 584-B. Indeed, New York specifically uses the UDMSA’s 
language providing for a maximum initial fee of $400, a maximum monthly fee of $50, 
and a maximum of 30% of the amount saved on any settled debt. Id.  
 146 Witzel, supra note 7, at 653. Disclosing details of any relationship with 
creditors is more relevant to credit counselors that are employed or paid by creditors. 
As previously noted, debt-settlement companies do not have a history of opaque 
relationships with creditors; in fact, creditors often disapprove of the debt-settlement 
industry. See supra Part II.C. As such, this particular type of regulation will not be 
discussed here. 
 147 UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. ACT § 6 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. 
State Laws 2005).  
 148 Id. §§ 13, 14. 
 149 Id. § 22(h). 
 150 Id. § 23. 
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settlement companies may only charge up to 30% of the 
amount saved on a settled debt.151 
The UDMSA goal of “requiring adequate financial 
education” speaks to disclosure as well as education. Prior to 
performing debt-management services, debt-settlement 
companies must provide an itemized list of services and 
charges, as well as a list of predicted settlement outcomes with 
each creditor.152 In addition, the UDMSA requires that these 
companies disclose the adverse consequences of participating in 
their programs. Companies must inform clients that the service 
may adversely affect their credit scores.153 They also must 
advise clients that there may be better alternatives like 
bankruptcy and that any settled debt may be taxable as 
income.154 Supplementing these disclosure requirements, a debt-
settlement company is required to provide prospective clients 
with “reasonable education about the management of personal 
finance.”155 According to the comment accompanying this 
subsection, education may be a “group class” or an “electronic 
educational program,” but it “must be substantially more than 
an explanation of the benefits of a plan.”156 Noting that 
financial-literacy education is becoming more commonplace, 
the UDMSA comments also explain that the state 
administrator may promulgate more detailed rules for 
education as standards for effective financial literacy develop.157 
Finally, the UDMSA regulations require a debt-
management service to determine that a particular plan is 
suitable for an individual before the individual enrolls in the 
  
 151 Id. The numbers presented here are absolute-maximum amounts allowed 
under the UDMSA. Actual fee structures are based on the amount of debt under 
contract in various ways. For example, a debt-settlement company may only charge a 
set-up fee “in an amount not exceeding the lesser of $400 and four percent of the debt 
in the plan at the inception of the plan.” Id. § 23(d)(2)(A). The UDMSA also requires 
that debt-settlement contracts provide cancellation within three days of creation with 
no obligation and cancellation upon notice by the individual at anytime with the right 
to a refund of unexpended funds. Id. §§ 19, 20. This protects a debtor’s money by 
allowing cancellation of a contract without liability for further payments.  
 152 Id. § 17(a), (c). Prediction of settlement outcomes need not be particular as 
to an amount. The UDMSA creates four categories in which a creditor must be 
predicatively placed by a debt-settlement company: (1) those that will participate and 
grant concessions, (2) those that will participate but not grant concessions, (3) those 
that will not participate, and (4) all others. Id. § 17(c)(3).  
 153 Id. § 17(d). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. § 17(b)(1). 
 156 Id. § 17 cmt. 2. 
 157 Id.  
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service’s plan.158 For a prospective client of a debt-settlement 
company, suitability “means at a minimum that the individual 
does not have the ability to satisfy creditors out of current 
income within a reasonable time even if the creditors were to 
reduce finance charges and fees for late payment, default, and 
delinquency.”159 A debt-settlement company must also 
determine that an individual will be able to fulfill the payment 
schedule of the chosen settlement plan.160  
To enforce the UDMSA regulations, the UDMSA gives 
the state administrator power to order a cease and desist, to 
order payment of restitution, and to prosecute a civil action 
independently or on an individual’s behalf.161 In addition to 
public enforcement, an individual may bring a civil action to 
recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, and 
reasonable attorney’s fees.162 
C. FTC Rulemaking 
Apart from federal and state legislation, the FTC has 
recently adopted rule changes targeting the debt-settlement 
industry.163 This rulemaking amended the current 
Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) to bring more aspects of debt-
relief services within the regulations.164 Generally, the TSR 
regulates various business practices of companies engaged in 
telemarketing.165 Telemarketing is defined as (1) soliciting the 
sale of goods or services using a telephone and (2) making more 
than one interstate phone call.166 Previously, the TSR applied 
only to outbound calls made by debt-relief services.167 But the 
new rule encompasses inbound calls as well, bringing “virtually 
all debt relief telemarketing transactions” within the TSR’s 
  
 158 Id. § 17(b)(3)(B).  
 159 Id. § 17 cmt. 4. 
 160 Id. § 17(b)(3)(B).  
 161 Id. § 33. The state administrator is the agency or entity chosen by the state 
to enforce the UDMSA. Id. § 2(1).  
 162 Id. § 35.  
 163 Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010) 
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). The deadline to submit written comments in 
response to this rule’s requisite notice of proposed rulemaking was October 9, 2009. 
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988 (Aug. 19, 2009). 
 164 See Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,458.  
 165 Id.  
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 48,501-02. 
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coverage.168 At the outset, it is important to understand that the 
statute authorizing the FTC to implement the TSR (and thus, 
this proposed rulemaking) creates a federal private cause of 
action for injunctive relief or damages, provided that the 
amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.169 
Under the new rule, a debt-relief service is defined 
broadly and is intended to cover debt-settlement services.170 
Specifically, a debt-relief service is defined as 
any program or service represented, directly or by implication, to 
renegotiate, settle, or in any way alter the terms of payment or other 
terms of the debt between a person and one or more unsecured 
creditors or debt collectors, including, but not limited to, a reduction 
in the balance, interest rate, or fees owed by a person to an 
unsecured creditor or debt collector.171 
In promulgating this new rule, the FTC sought to regulate all 
procedures sold to consumers, and it added the word “program” 
to ensure this wide breadth.172  
The new FTC rule also subjects debt-settlement 
companies to mandatory disclosure, an important aspect of 
regulation for the FTC. Under one general set of provisions, 
debt-settlement companies must disclose (1) the total costs of 
services; (2) all “material restrictions, limitations, or conditions 
to purchase, receive, or use the goods or services”; and (3) the 
seller’s refund policy.173 The rule also mandates disclosure of the 
time required to achieve resolution—including the specific time 
when a settlement company will tender settlements to 
creditors—and the amount of money that must accumulate 
  
 168 Id. As an initial matter, these amendments are subject to the jurisdictional 
limitations of the TSR and the FTC Act. One noteworthy limitation is that all nonprofit 
entities are exempted from these regulations. Id. at 48,465-66. The FTC acknowledged 
concerns that many abusive debt-relief services might remain unregulated because 
they are technically nonprofits. Id. at 48,465. It concluded, however, that it lacks 
authority under the TSR’s governing statute to regulate nonprofit entities. Id. at 
48,465-66.  
 169 15 U.S.C. § 6104 (2006). The statute also provides a civil cause of action for 
any state attorney general. Id. § 6103.  
 170 Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,516-17. The last 
clause of the definition, however, limits the definitional scope to unsecured creditors or 
debt collectors operating with unsecured debt. This was done intentionally to exclude 
mortgage loan-modification plans. The FTC noted that there are problems with 
fraudulent mortgage-relief companies that are similar to debt-settlement operations 
but that need to be regulated in different ways for various reasons. Id. 
 171 Id. at 48,516-17.  
 172 Id. at 48,466 n.123. 
 173 Id. at 48,517.  
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before settlement is offered.174 Additionally, the new rule 
requires that debt-settlement companies advise clients of 
certain risks—namely, that creditors may pursue collection 
efforts (including litigation) during the debt-settlement 
program, and that participating in a settlement program will 
likely result in an adverse credit rating and may increase the 
total amount of debt owed.175 
Much beyond disclosure, the FTC also adopted a 
solution to the unsound practice of charging upfront fees. The 
new rule prohibits requesting or receiving payment for any 
debt-relief service unless the company has “renegotiated, 
settled, reduced, or otherwise altered the terms of at least one 
debt pursuant to a settlement agreement.”176 This upfront-fee 
ban applies to all debt-relief services—including debt-
settlement companies, which, as explained above, hold a 
client’s funds in escrow until enough have accumulated to offer 
a settlement. The rule states that the FTC “does not intend 
that the advance fee ban be interpreted to prohibit a consumer 
from using legitimate escrow services . . . to save money in 
anticipation of settlement,”177 though this language does seem 
to explicitly prohibit collecting any part of a flat fee prior to 
settling a debt.178  
Less clear, however, are other fees often charged by 
debt-settlement companies—namely, service fees, initiation 
fees, and other account-maintenance or administrative-type 
fees. Companies charge these fees before any debt has been 
settled, but one could argue that this practice does not violate 
the ban on upfront fees because these other fees are required to 
facilitate escrow services for the client until enough funds have 
accumulated. The FTC has concluded, however, that all upfront 
fees charges by debt-relief providers are an abusive business 
practice.179 
  
 174 Id. at 48,518. 
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. at 48,519. 
 177 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988 (Aug. 19, 2009).  
 178 See supra Part II. A flat-fee model charges a percentage of the total debt 
and is typically collected—entirely or in part—before any settlement is achieved.  
 179 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 42,006. To determine if a 
practice is abusive, the FTC uses a three-prong unfairness test. A practice is unfair if 
“1) the conduct at issue causes substantial injury to consumers; 2) the harm resulting 
from the conduct is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits; and 3) the harm is 
not reasonably avoidable.” Id. at 42,005. 
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V. THE IDEAL REGULATION 
To determine ideal regulation of the debt-settlement 
industry, one must answer two questions: (1) where should 
regulation originate,180 and (2) what particulars should the 
regulation include? 
A. Source of Regulation 
To the first question, we have seen potential regulation 
originate from uniform state law, federal law, and federal-
agency regulation. Congress’s recent actions in regulating debt-
relief services show that it is likely to stay out of the issue.181 As 
a practical matter, then, it is appropriate here to analyze the 
benefits of uniform state law and federal-agency regulation.  
The NCCUSL is known as a private legislature because 
it cannot pass binding laws; it can only suggest passage to 
traditional legislatures.182 It has also been called an elite 
legislature because its members are chosen by state governors 
based on their expertise and sophistication in a particular area 
of law.183 As one commentator has noted, NCCUSL 
“[c]ommissioners are likely to draft laws that are clearer, better 
understood, and with more insight” than state legislatures.184  
Even if true, however, these factors may not warrant 
placing regulation of the debt-settlement industry in the 
NCCUSL’s hands. One problem is that the NCCUSL 
coordinates and embraces interest-group activities, injecting 
bias into uniform laws.185 The NCCUSL invites interest-group 
advisers and self-interested American Bar Association 
committees to participate in drafting the laws.186 As a result, 
  
 180 Implicit in the question is, to whom should the power of enforcement be given? 
 181 As noted supra text accompanying notes 125-27, Congress failed to act on 
comprehensive regulation in 2003; it proposed expedited rulemaking powers for the 
FTC in 2009; and recently, it created a new federal agency tasked with consumer 
protection. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33. It is highly unlikely, then, that 
Congress will now be a venue for regulation. 
 182 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private 
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 596 (1995).  
 183 See White, supra note 135, at 2132. 
 184 Id. Indeed, it is also argued that because its product must be approved by 
fifty state legislatures, NCCUSL is forced to engage in a much more careful 
deliberative process. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will 
Fail: Article 9, Capture and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 583 (1998).  
 185 See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of 
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 142-43 (1996).  
 186 Id. 
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“the drafting process may be biased towards business rather 
than consumer groups.”187 Unbalanced lobbying efforts also 
result when the burdens of a proposed law fall on a small, 
concentrated group while its benefits are distributed among a 
large, diffuse group.188 In this context, “the small and 
concentrated group can use its own resources . . . to acquire 
rules favorable to itself and possibly detrimental to the larger, 
diffuse group.”189 Besides producing a biased law, interest-group 
involvement may hinder the ultimate ratification of uniform 
laws. At the state level, interest-group opposition “can prevent 
widespread adoption of an efficient NCCUSL proposal.”190  
The UDMSA—and, indeed, any NCCUSL regulation of 
the debt-services industry—is prone to these exact problems. 
Debt-management-services providers bear the costs and 
burdens of the regulation, while the benefits go to the diffuse 
population of debt-holding consumers nationwide. Naturally, 
this dynamic creates strong incentives for the debt-settlement 
industry to participate in drafting the UDMSA. It likewise 
creates very little incentive for the individual consumer to 
participate, even though that consumer is within the 
population that benefits.  
NCCUSL proposals are also prone to negative results 
when interest groups mount equal lobbying campaigns in 
competition with each other. Often, active interest-group 
competition results when a legislative proposal would 
substantially change the status quo.191 The NCCUSL generally 
reacts to coequal lobbying with a conservative stance—
adopting “no new rules at all” or “vague rules that appear to 
accomplish something, but in fact do not.”192 Thus, if consumer 
interests were equally represented in the lobbying and drafting 
process, the UDMSA regulations would likely do little to effect 
meaningful change in the debt-settlement industry.  
  
 187 Id. at 143. Consumers and consumer-oriented groups may also be much 
better equipped to pressure public legislatures than the NCCUSL, given the latter’s 
procedural inclusion of interest groups. Id. at 142-43. Similarly, public legislatures 
have institutional tools that foster production of diverse and reliable information 
whereas private legislatures do not. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 182, at 630.  
 188 Janger, supra note 184, at 584-85; Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 185, at 143. 
 189 Janger, supra note 184, at 585. 
 190 Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 186, at 143.  
 191 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 183, at 636. 
 192 Id. at 637.  
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In any event, the NCCUSL has a low rate of adoption in 
state legislatures.193 Opposition to adopting a uniform law 
makes failure the likely result, regardless of how proficient the 
proposal may be.194 The UDMSA, though already enacted in 
some states, would face sharp opposition from an acutely 
interested industry if it imposed anything considered a 
constraint on business.195 The goal of uniform laws is 
uniformity; thus, uniform laws should not be proposed if there 
is a risk of failure.196 Since the UDMSA is either likely to be 
ineffective at regulating the debt-settlement industry or prone 
to failure at the state level, uniform state laws are not the ideal 
means of regulation in this context.  
The FTC, by contrast, avoids both of these problems. As 
an agency with a relatively broad mandate of authority, the 
FTC is free of “interest group capture.”197 Moreover, the FTC’s 
rules have uniform applicability.198 Unlike the UDMSA, FTC 
rulemaking would create complete national coverage and 
  
 193 As of 1991, “[o]f the more than 200 uniform acts, 107 have been adopted by 
fewer than ten states; 77 of those have not made the grade in even five states, and a 
number of uniform acts have earned zero adoptions.” White, supra note 135, at 2103. 
 194 See id. at 2132. As one commentator has written,  
The pull to make the law technically better is an engine of modest 
horsepower. Going up even the smallest incline . . . it is soon unable to move 
forward. When there is only a modest incline and no opposition, as in the case 
of laws concerning procedural issues in the courts, this engine can carry its 
load to the destination, but only in such circumstances. 
Id. 
 195 It is difficult to ascertain the extent of the debt-settlement industry’s direct 
involvement in the UDMSA’s drafting. But speaking to the general idea that the 
industry is acutely aware and interested in any potential regulation, the FTC held a 
public workshop on September 25, 2008, for which it received thirty-five public 
comments from debt-settlement companies and trade associations. All these comments 
are available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtsettlementworkshop/index.shtm. 
There is no reason to believe that the industry as a whole was and is any less 
interested in the UDMSA.  
 196 See Janger, supra note 184, at 593 (arguing that, when certain 
circumstances indicate that the uniform law process is likely to fail, the “NCCUSL 
should decline to regulate the area and leave the question to federal law or nonuniform 
state law”).  
 197 See Sidney M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer 
Protection: Regulatory Change and Administrative Pragmatism, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 
911, 938 (2005). In Milkis’s view, although the FTC was not institutionally or 
historically designed to avoid capture, it has become the agency’s biggest strength. Id. 
at 911-13. He supports this thesis with three case studies on consumer-protection 
actions, including one examining the Telemarketing Sales Rule. Id. at 927.  
 198 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,989 (Aug. 19, 2009).  
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uniformity.199 And uniformity may prompt less industry 
opposition. Since many debt-settlement companies operate 
nationally, a uniform rule provides “the advantage[] of having 
to comply with only one law.”200  
Despite these strengths, however, there is a legitimate 
concern that the FTC lacks the ability to effectively enforce its 
own consumer-protection regulations. The agency has a relatively 
small budget and is charged with overseeing a large number of 
businesses and transactions.201 Of particular concern, “the sheer 
number of actions the FTC can bring in any given year is 
insignificant compared to the nature and scope of the consumer 
protection problems plaguing consumers and honest businesses in 
the United States.”202 As a result, most defrauded consumers thus 
have no recourse after filing a complaint with the FTC.203 
There is an easy solution to this problem: a private 
cause of action. A private cause of action was expressly 
considered and ultimately rejected when the FTC Act was 
originally passed in 1914.204 Lawmakers recognized that, 
because the FTC Act was purposefully broad, a private cause of 
action would destroy predictability, be abused by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, and burden the court system.205 While “the FTC was 
composed of a body of experts and economists who could create 
policy in a reasoned, orderly, and forward-looking fashion . . . 
  
 199 See Mark E. Budnitz, Martina Rojo & Julia Marlowe, Deceptive Claims for 
Prepaid Telephone Cards and the Need for Regulation, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 14 
(2006).  
 200 Id. Budnitz argues that the best approach to regulating prepaid telephone 
cards is through federal legislation giving the FTC rulemaking authority. Congress has 
already given the FTC authority to regulate the debt-settlement industry, as seen in 
the FTC’s recent rulemaking. Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 
48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). But Budnitz’s reasons for a 
federal approach remain relevant in this context.  
 201 See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 442 (1991).  
 202 Robert M. Langer, Point: State Attorneys General Should Have Broad 
Powers to Enforce a Federal Telemarketing Fraud Law, 5 ANTITRUST 36, 36 (1991).  
 203 Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Ind. 
1976). The Guernsey court noted that  
[m]ost defrauded customers have no remedy at all because the Government 
cannot possibly act in more than a small fraction of all of the cases of deceit 
and overreaching against consumers. The [FTC] currently receives about 
9,000 complaints a year and is only able to investigate one out of eight or 
nine of these, and, of the small fraction investigated, only one in ten results 
in a cease and desist order. 
Id. 
 204 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 91, at 12.  
 205 Id. at 13-14.  
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private lawsuits, on the other hand, create[] policy in a 
piecemeal and retroactive manner.”206 The Act has not been 
amended to include a private cause of action.207  
The legislature’s concerns were valid when the FTC Act 
was enacted and remain valid today. But the new FTC rules 
regulating the debt-settlement industry do not trigger these 
concerns. First, despite the breadth of the FTC Act, the new 
rules are specific, top-down provisions that are not subject to 
judicial discretion. In this context, a private cause of action 
would not create policy retroactively. To the contrary, banning 
specific actions by a debt-settlement company is an “orderly” 
and “forward-looking” policy.208 And a private cause of action 
would be a much-needed means of enforcement. Moreover, 
there is little reason for concern that a private cause of action 
would be exploited by plaintiffs or overburden the judiciary. 
The vast majority of potential plaintiffs are low-income 
consumers whose access to legal representation is, at the very 
least, limited. Nor would a private cause of action compromise 
predictability because this regulation is built of narrow, specific 
provisions—unlike the FTC Act, which is broad and open to 
interpretation.209  
The cause of action allowed under the FTC regulations 
is inadequate because it is preconditioned on an amount in 
controversy exceeding $50,000.210 Losses to fraudulent debt-
settlement companies are frequently no more than a few 
thousand dollars per case. Moreover, individual consumers 
cannot rely on the FTC to redress these losses. As discussed 
earlier in this note, the FTC does not excel at this level of 
enforcement.211 An unrestrained private cause of action 
provided by FTC rulemaking is the best approach to regulate 
the debt-settlement industry. Although the FTC’s recent rule 
amendments are a good start, consumer protection means 
nothing without enforcement. Without a private cause of 
  
 206 Id. at 15.  
 207 Id. at 14.  
 208 Id. at 15. 
 209 Indeed, the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). A private cause of action would force courts to interpret this 
phrase on a case-by-case basis. Contrast this with the FTC’s recent proposed rule, 
which prohibits receiving a fee before a particular debt is settled. Telemarketing Sales 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,020 (Aug. 19, 2009). Issues of interpretation arise in any 
litigation, but even with a private cause of action, debt-settlement regulations would 
result in much more predictability and much less ambiguity than the FTC Act.  
 210 15 U.S.C. § 6104 (2006). 
 211 See supra text accompanying notes 88-93. 
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action—one that does not impose a threshold amount in 
controversy—the new regulations will often go unenforced, 
substantially undermining their efficacy.  
B. Particulars of Regulation 
The second question remains: of what particulars should 
regulation be composed? Generally speaking, the UDMSA 
focuses on registering companies, mandating education, and 
imposing fee caps for debt settlement, whereas FTC 
rulemaking emphasizes banning upfront fees. Both proposed 
regulations include significant disclosure requirements.  
Disclosure is a laudable characteristic of any business 
practice. In this context, however, it has limited value. 
Mandating disclosure often results in “creative compliance” by 
companies—that is, printed communications too complicated or 
convoluted for the average customer to understand.212 
Regardless of the information’s clarity or value, consumers 
frequently do not read contracts.213 Thus, requiring a company 
to “inform” consumers that debt settlement may adversely 
affect their credit scores, as the UDMSA does,214 is window 
dressing that would benefit few consumers. In fact, many debt-
settlement companies already disclose pertinent information—
voluntarily or pursuant to state law—but consumers are 
uninformed nonetheless because they rarely read contracts.215 
Further, the FTC Act and its state analogs also prohibit 
companies’ questionable representations, albeit with less 
clarity than would provisions tailored specifically to the debt-
  
 212 Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing 
Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 
660-61 (2009); see generally Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques 
of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199 (2005) (arguing that existing disclosure regimes—
particularly the Truth in Lending Act—fail to reduce information asymmetries in the 
consumer-finance industry). Moreover, extensive disclosure requirements are worth 
little when potential debt-settlement clients are in stressful financial situations; 
“desperate consumers will tend to focus most on the representations made in the 
advertisements about how these services can relieve them of their debt worries.” Letter 
from Consumer Fed’n of Am. to the Sec’y of the Fed. Trade Comm’n 10 (Oct. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00161.pdf. 
 213 See Stark & Choplin, supra note 212, at 655-56.  
 214 UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. ACT, § 17(d)(3) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on 
Unif. State Laws 2005). 
 215 Letter from S. Brooklyn Legal Servs. to the Sec’y of the Fed. Trade Comm’n 
7-8 (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-
00216.pdf. 
2011] DEBT SETTLEMENT 1197 
settlement industry.216 Disclosure would provide benefits for 
certain consumers—possibly warranting inclusion—but it 
cannot be the gravitas of this regulation.  
Debt-settlement services have an enormous potential for 
consumer financial harm. Damage results not only from high fees 
but also from high failure rates. Legal action by creditors and 
worsened credit scores are often unavoidable consequences of the 
service as it exists today. Since this potential harm is the central 
problem of the industry, it must be the focus of regulation.  
Banning upfront fees is the proper solution to address 
these problems. Advance fees allow debt-settlement companies 
to benefit from client payment stagnation while taking no risk 
of their own. Even if a consumer is unable to save money in 
escrow (and thus does not proceed to benefit from the service), 
debt-settlement companies still profit from advance fees.217 This 
delay is fundamentally problematic for consumers: it increases 
the risk of failure and creditor legal action while worsening 
credit worthiness and doing nothing to lessen debt. Debt-
settlement companies seek this business because it is 
profitable. And they target consumers that cannot afford debt-
settlement services in the first place.218 As an unregulated 
service, debt-settlement companies can profit by contracting 
with anyone holding unsecured debt. 
A ban on upfront fees provides these companies with a 
natural incentive to screen clients for potential success. 
Prohibiting advance fees increases the profit margin that exists 
in clients that could actually save enough money to effectuate a 
settlement. With an advance-fee bar in place, companies will 
voluntarily screen potential clients, limiting abusive 
  
 216 See supra Part III.  
 217 See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to the Sec’y of the Fed. Trade 
Comm’n 9 (Oct. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Letter to FTC], available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00192.pdf (arguing that, without a ban on advance 
fees, “there is minimal incentive for debt relief companies charging up-front fees to 
perform services because they collect these substantial fees regardless of whether they 
negotiate anything for the consumer, succeed in settling any of the consumer’s debts for 
a reduced amount, or take any action at all on behalf of the consumer”).  
 218 See id. (stating concern that “the current regulatory regime—in which 
collection of substantial up-front fees is not prohibited—is such that increasing 
numbers of unscrupulous operators will flock to this industry”). This comment also 
references a classified advertisement in a Portland, Oregon, newspaper that claimed, 
“This is truly the NEXT WAVE!! I’m sure you heard about it. Debt Settlement! . . . You 
can be part of it and make a fantastic residual income!!! You too can potentially earn a 
Million dollars in the next 12 months! Free Complete Training! No Fee To Become An 
Affiliate!” Id. at 9 n.14.  
1198 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3 
contracting.219 It would also force companies to provide services 
quickly and efficiently—to work with a client’s creditors earlier 
in the process to achieve an earlier payday. Banning upfront 
fees would increase overall success rates, minimize creditor 
action because of shortened default periods and ensure that 
consumers owe fees only once a benefit has been realized.  
The industry claims that debt-settlement companies are 
unable to operate without upfront fees. It bases this claim on 
several arguments. First, the industry argues that the 
settlement process is continuous and ongoing, making advance 
payment a requirement for creditor communication, and that 
creditor communication is the relevant unit of work justifying 
compensation.220 Second, debt-settlement companies have 
relatively large client-acquisition costs, which justify advance 
fees.221 Finally, the industry warns that only large existing 
companies would be able to operate without upfront fees, 
meaning that the ban would harm competition.222 
These objections are without merit. The hypothetical 
value of debt settlement is reducing a consumer’s debt load by 
negotiating settlements with creditors. The value does not 
derive from general communication with creditors, nor does it 
derive from an expanded client base. Consumers are willing to 
pay fees to have their debts settled—not for a company to 
communicate with their creditors.223 Every business has costs 
associated with its intended results. The entitlement to profit 
  
 219 Over the past decade, various state laws have attempted to rein in 
subprime and other predatory home-loan providers by banning upfront fees. See Daniel 
Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Market Development, and the 
Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 470-71 (2009). Some studies suggest that 
antipredatory lending laws discouraged providers from offering the riskiest loans. Id. 
at 483-84; Comptroller of the Currency, Economic Issues in Predatory Lending 19-20 
(OCC Working Paper July 30, 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/working 
paper.pdf. In the case of debt settlement, a ban on upfront fees would discourage 
companies from contracting with the riskiest clients (i.e., those most unable to 
complete a debt-settlement program and thus most likely to gain no benefit from debt 
settlement).  
 220 Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Workshop: Consumer Protection 
and Debt Settlement Industry, at 189 (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter FTC Transcript] 
(statement of Michael Mallow), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ 
debtsettlement/OfficialTranscript.pdf (“I don’t believe that in a debt settlement 
company the unit of work is the successful completion of the settlement and the 
satisfaction thereof.”); see also id. at 113 (statement of Jack Craven).  
 221 ASS’N OF SETTLEMENT COS., STUDY ON THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 4-
5 (2007) [hereinafter STUDY ON THE INDUSTRY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
comments/debtsettlementworkshop/536796-00014.pdf.  
 222 FTC Transcript, supra note 220, at 187 (statement of Wesley Young). 
 223 See Letter to FTC, supra note 217, at 10 (“[I]t is marketing, lead generation 
and referral costs that drive the debt settlement industry’s zeal for up-front fees.”). 
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comes from providing a service that has a client value greater 
than its provider costs. Debt-settlement companies deserve 
payment only after a client has received a benefit—that is, once 
a debt has been settled.  
To be sure, the ban on advance fees could potentially 
constrain competition. The FTC noted that a “prohibition could 
increase the costs incurred by any legitimate providers of debt-
relief services, make it impossible for some firms to continue to 
exist, and reduce the ability of new firms to enter the 
market.”224 A ban may necessitate “additional capitalization, in 
the form of borrowing or investment.”225 As a result, the 
industry claims, debt settlement will become more expensive 
and less accessible. But the industry is currently contracting 
with far more consumers than it can reasonably provide 
beneficial services for.226 The ban on advance fees would 
eliminate predatory firms, allowing legitimate settlement 
providers to fairly compete in the market and price their 
services accurately. To the extent that constrained supply 
would increase the costs of debt-settlement services, these costs 
“would be unlikely to outweigh the consumer injury resulting 
from the current fee practice.”227 Banning upfront fees mitigates 
the most harmful aspect of debt settlement without creating 
unreasonable costs for the industry.  
For precisely these reasons, banning upfront fees is more 
desirable than the UDMSA approach of imposing fee 
maximums. While a fee maximum would hypothetically save a 
client more money in escrow, since less would be taken for fees 
(much as banning advance fees would), it does not give the debt-
settlement company any incentive to complete settlement 
services more efficiently. Fee maximums would not compel client 
screening because clients with no chance of completing 
companies’ settlement programs would still be profitable. There 
is also no incentive to mitigate creditor intervention because 
  
 224 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,988, 42,008 (Aug. 19, 2009).  
 225 Id. Some form of capital reserve via bond or insurance is required under 
the UDMSA to protect against insolvency in the event of a judgment against the 
company. UNIF. DEBT MGMT. SERVS. ACT §§ 13, 14 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on 
Unif. State Laws 2005). The UDMSA’s registration requirement is largely intended to 
effectuate this mandated capitalization. Banning upfront fees might also force debt-
settlement companies to maintain a reserve and may mitigate the need to impose 
registration requirements on debt-settlement companies.  
 226 A voluntary study conducted by an industry trade association reported success 
rates only as high as 60%. STUDY ON THE INDUSTRY, supra note 221, at 1. This means that, 
at minimum, 40% of debt-settlement clients realize no benefits from the service. 
 227 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 42,008. 
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these companies would collect fees—albeit at a more modest 
level—regardless of whether a client falls further into financial 
turmoil. The ban on upfront fees is the most advantageous 
approach to regulating the debt-settlement industry, and the 
FTC is wise to adopt it as its regulatory centerpiece instead of 
fee maximums or mere compelled disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
The debt-settlement industry is likely to continue its 
rapid growth. But the existing regulation is insufficient to 
protect consumers from the harm caused by debt settlement. 
Neither the UDMSA nor the FTC’s recent rulemaking are 
perfect, but each contains elements helpful in ensuring that 
debt-settlement programs provide financial benefits. 
Ultimately, the FTC’s recent regulation banning upfront fees is 
a strong start. Still, the FTC must also provide for an 
unreserved private cause of action to guarantee proper 
enforcement. As it stands now, debt settlement is a beast that 
tramples consumer welfare. But with the proper reins, debt 
settlement can provide legitimate help to those facing the 
burden of unsecured debt. 
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